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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF
WILLS, ESTATES AND TRUSTS
By

PAUL

S.

GOLDMAN*

It was not the statement of a new rule of law that was startling
in Wright v. Poudre Valley Nat'l Bank,' but rather the court's failure to state a rule. The testator, providing for distribution of his
estate if all his brothers and sisters were dead at the death of his
daughter, directed that his estate
be divided between the surviving children of any deceased
brothers and sisters and the children of any thereof who are
deceased, share and share alike, the grandchildren of a deceased brother or sister collectively to receive the amount
their immediate ancestor would have received had such
immediate ancestor survived my said daughter [a life beneficiary].
At the date of the life beneficiary's death, there were two living
nieces of the testator and numerous living children and grandchildren of thirteen deceased nieces and nephews.
In reversing the lower court, the supreme court determined
that there should have been a per capita division of the estate into
fifteen equal shares, with one share for each of the surviving nieces,
and one share for each deceased niece or nephew who left children
surviving, the latter shares then going per stirpes to the children
of the deceased nieces and nephews. While this writer concurs in
the result, it is felt that the court failed to state a rule requisite to
reaching that result.
The supreme court cited the rule that words such as "share and
share alike" usually require a per capita distribution, 2 but went no
further. Using that rule by itself, as the court did, the children of
the deceased nieces and nephews might have successfully argued
that they too were entitled to per capita distribution. While taking
cognizance of the testator's subsequent provision that the children
of deceased nieces and nephews were to take per stirpes, the court
failed to explain how it got around the fact that the words "share
and share alike" immediately followed the devise to the children of
the deceased nephews and nieces as well as the devise to those surviving.
In reversing the lower court, the supreme court also determined
that no distribution should be made to any descendants more remote than the grandchildren of the testator's brothers and sisters,
citing the well-established rule that the word "children" will be interpreted as meaning "immediate or first degree offspring," in the3
absence of other intent being indicated by the testator's language.
Although the facts of the case are more closely connected with4
problems in the field of domestic relations, Ward v. Terriere
Senior Student, University of Denver College of Law.
1 385 P.2d 412 (Colo. 1963).
2 In re Carroll's Estate, 62 Cal. App. 2d 798, 145 P.2d 644 (1944); Chisholm v. Bradley, 99 N.H.
12, 104 A.2d 514 (1954); In re Bray's Will, 260 Wis. 9, 49 N.W.2d 716 (1951).
3 Thompson, Wills § 273 (3rd ed. 1947).
4 386 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1963).
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serves as an example of the complexities with which those in the
probate and trust field often find themselves involved. The plaintiff
claimed rights as a widow on the theory that the divorce between
herself and the decedent was invalid, and that even if the divorce
had been valid, she and the decedent again became husband and
wife by operation of a common law remarriage.
The plaintiff's claim that the divorce was invalid rested on the
ground that she had caused the word "dismissed" to be entered in
the order book of the county court, nearly four years after the
interlocutory decree had been entered. The supreme court determined that since the divorce decree had become final six months
after entered,5 the word "dismissed" later entered in an order book
in the clerk's office had no effect.
The question of the alleged common law remarriage was resolved against the plaintiff on conflicting testimony in the trial
court. The supreme court held that although there is a Colorado
case holding that a common law remarriage may be proved by less
than the positive and convincing proof necessary to establish a
common law marriage,6 that decision "was
not intended to strip the
'7
trial court of its fact-finding function.
In State v. Estate of Fisch,s a Colorado testator made a bequest
to a non-profit Texas corporation. The Texas corporation was denied
inheritance tax exemption by a Colorado court on the ground that
Texas does not grant reciprocal exemptions to Colorado charities.9
The American Lutheran Church, a Minnesota non-profit organization, then brought this action to recover the taxes paid by the Texas
corporation under protest, claiming that the Texas charity was a
subsidiary. The trial court ordered the taxes refunded, reasoning
that the Texas corporation, being a subsidiary of the Minnesota
corporation, could not receive the bequest and therefore could not
be taxed.
The supreme court considered the decisive question, whether
the Texas charity could take the gift directly without first having
to funnel it through its Minnesota parent organization, and followed
an earlier ruling that the law of the legatee's domicile determines
5 Colo. Sess. Laws 1929, ch. 91, § 3.
6 In re Peterson's Estate, 148 Cola. 52, 365 P.2d 254 (1961). See also 39 Dicta 102 (1962).
7 French v. Terriere, 386 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1963).
8 387 P.2d 282 (Colo. 1963).
9 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 138-4-.15 (1953).
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the legatee's capacity to take. 10 Texas law gives non-profit charitable organizations the right to acquire and hold property; the
supreme court ruled that the Texas charity took the gift directly,
and because Texas does not reciprocate with Colorado in granting
exemptions to charities, the tax was properly assessed.
An interesting collateral question arose from the fact that no
court reporter was present in the trial court. The plaintiff contended
that in the absence of a transcript, the supreme court was bound to
presume that the findings and conclusions of the trial court were
correct and that the adduced evidence supported the judgment."
The supreme court determined that stipulations equivalent to testimony, coupled with legal documents in evidence, constituted a
sufficient record.
Articles for the "One Year Review of Colorado Law" are usually confined to noting significant cases considered by the Supreme
Court of Colorado. This year, however, a ruling by the Denver
County Court is of sufficient interest to be included. In Altshuler v.
Grandy,'12 professional heir-hunters sought a declaration of their
right to examine and make copies of probate records and any papers
filed despite a statutory restriction of such access to "parties in
interest, or their attorneys.""3 Held: this restriction applies in probate proceedings despite another statutory provision which states
that such access shall be without charge. 14 The county court ruled
that this latter provision means only that "where the right of inspection exists, the right of inspection exists without charge."",
10 Galiger v. Armstrong, 114 Colo. 397, 165 P.2d 1019 (1946).
11 Burton v. Garner, 374 P.2d 707 (Colo. 1962); Teets v. Richardson,
(1955); Meagher v. Neal, 130 Colo. 7, 272 P.2d 992 (1954).
12 102 Trusts & Estates 732 (1963).
13 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 35-1-1 (1953).
14 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-5-12 (1953).
15 Supra note 12.

131 Colo. 592, 284 P.2d 233

